By: Jerome Auza
The Philippines will conduct next year its third national election that uses automated machines to count the ballots. In the past two elections, accusations of electronic cheating abound but such accusations are very hard to prove without a manual count of the ballots. Manual counting, of course, is not feasible due to the massive cost involved and the huge logistics resources required. But is electronic cheating of the PCOS machines possible at all?
Of course, whatever method is used for counting the ballots, there is a way to engage in cheating. The PCOS machines are not excluded. Even if the PCOS machines and the system behind it are somehow built to be 100% cheat-proof, the cheating can happen outside of the system in the form of vote buying, use of government funds for campaigning and other tactics that can be done on election day to reduce or increase the voters able to vote for a certain candidate.
But is the so-called “E-Cheating”, where the numbers are manipulated electronically in the official tally, be possible at all? Republic Act No. 8436, the law covering the automated counting of ballots, does not explicitly specify the means to prevent electronic fraud. While giving copies of the ballot count to different parties and agencies can be deemed as a way to prevent fraud, the process is not protected if the cheating is done prior to the printing of the election returns.
Would the random manual count audit help detect electronic fraud? Unfortunately, in the way it was implemented in the 2013 national election, the answer is no. The reason is that the list of randomly selected precincts where the manual audit will be conducted is published days before the election. This may seem fine because the precincts are randomly selected. However, this process becomes pointless because the precincts to be audited are already known. So what would the cheaters do? Simple, exclude those precincts from ballot count manipulation. So when the audit is done, those precincts will show a very accurate match between actual votes and the machine count.
The selection of precincts for random manual audit should be done AFTER the printing of the ballot counts is done. This will make the work of COMELEC more challenging but this is the right way of doing it. They should just provide resources for this method. This was the way the audit was done in 2010. Why it was changed in 2013 is strange but it could also be intentional so that cheating can be done.
So how can cheating be done if the random manual audit is done the same way as in 2013? The process is a bit complicated but can be done because the PCOS machines are capable of being online to a central system. It can only be done with the participation of people familiar with the system and have access to the PCOS software.
First, the software that runs the PCOS machine checks at the central system if the machine is among those listed for random manual count audit. If it is, then the software will count the ballots without manipulation of the results. Second, if the machine is not for audit, the software will access the central system for the list of manipulated results it will print. Then it will print the manipulated results in several copies. Each group receives their copies which will then match the results tallied at the national level.
Even if the PCOS software source code is reviewed by independent agencies, the actual software loaded on the PCOS machines are not readable to humans so it can be manipulated and programmed to be able to implement the cheating scheme.
With the incorrect random manual count audit procedure in 2013, the process above can be done without a trace. To avoid it, COMELEC should do the selection of precincts for random manual audit after 90%, or some significant percentage, of the PCOS machines have submitted and printed their results. That way, any electronic manipulation can be detected by the audit. Candidates should insist to COMELEC that they do this procedure correctly so that electronic manipulation of votes would be much more difficult to pull off.
The coming national elections in 2016 will be a very significant event in the country, more so with the growing clamor for real change in the way the government is run. Filipinos are tired with election promises that are forgotten until it’s time to make promises again. We’ve been doing the same thing before: electing a popular candidate based only on his popularity and perceived “integrity”. Many voters do not consider the candidate’s track record of performance.
The good thing is that the citizens are now actively participating in scrutinizing our candidates. Social media has exposed politicians with a severe lack of discretion. Candidates who have questionable backgrounds or have participation in corrupt practices are revealed.
Our next president has an insurmountable challenge in running the country, ensuring economic growth, keeping peace and order and protecting the country’s boarders. A candidate with strong credentials, a sensible platform, proven track record and can show actual results of his leadership should be selected. Popularity is never enough of a qualification.
We should be very vigilant in May 2016 to ensure any means of cheating can be eliminated or at least minimized.
